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This article examines the political impact of economic liberalisation programmes in 
Venezuela from 1989 to 1998. Venezuela, a long-standing democracy, has experienced a 
virtual political implosion. The rapid downward spiral has seen an increasing crisis in 
governability that has been manifested by the collapse of the two main political parties, an 
increase in political polarization, more frequent coup attempts, alarming increases in voter 
absenteeism, the growing use of corruption scandals as instruments of political competition, 
the increasing frequency of mass and often violent street demonstrations, dramatic increases 
in crime, growing labour unrest including a two-month national workers strike, and the return 
of radical populist rhetoric and policy accompanied by a more authoritarian presidentialism 
that has been absent in Venezuela since the late 1940s.1 Accompanying the increase in 
ungovernability has been a severe economic crisis.  In the period 1988-2002, per capita 
income declines have been consistently among the worst in Latin America and percentage 
increases in income inequality, poverty and informal employment have been among the 
highest on the continent.   Regulatory deficiencies were also at the heart of one of Latin 
America’s worst banking collapses in the 1990s. 
 
In many ways, Venezuela was an unlikely candidate for political and economic implosion.  
First of all, the Venezuelan state has not had to contend with ethnic, regional, caste or 
religious conflicts that make governance and the maintenance of social order particularly 
difficult in many parts of the developing world.  Secondly, in the period 1958-1988, 
Venezuela maintained one of the most stable democratic systems in Latin America.   In this 
period, political pacts among the leading political parties and corporatist structures were the 
main institutional innovations and mechanisms of financing state- led industrialisation and 
patronage to maintain political stability. 2  The system was aptly described by Rey as a 
“populist system of reconciliation”. 3 Thus, crisis and breakdown in Venezuela have occurred 
in a polity that had accumulated substantially strong mechanisms to regulate and contain 
conflict.  Finally, Venezuela was for six decades before 1980, the second fastest growing 
economy in Latin America and the economy with the lowest inflation rate, the latter a sign of 
a polity that contains and regulates conflict. Given its relatively favourable initial conditions 
the Venezuelan case may prove to be an instructive case as to the stresses liberalisation can 
                                                 
1 J. McCoy, ‘Chavez and the End of “Partyarchy” in Venezuela’, Journal of Democracy, 10:3 (1999); A. 
Stambouli, La política extraviada, Caracas: Fundacion  para la Cultura Urbana, 2002;  K. Roberts, ‘Social 
Polarization and Populist Resurgence’, in S. Ellner and D. Hellinger (eds), Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez 
Era: Class, Polarization and Conflict , Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003. 
2 D. Levine, Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973; T. L. 
Karl, ‘Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela’, in G. O’Donnell, P.C. 
Schmitter, and L. Whitehead (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule .  Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986; J. C. Rey, ‘La Democracia Venezolana y La Crisis del Sistema Populista de Conciliación’, Estudios 
Políticos, 74 (October – December 1991). 
3 Rey (1991). 
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unleash, not only in transition economies,4 but in a late developing, capitalist, and long-
standing democratic polity.  
 
The causes for the breakdown of the Venezuelan polity are diverse with deep roots in history. 
It is not my intention to provide a theory of that breakdown.  This is because large-scale social 
changes that occur in a brief space of time are often the result of a unique, and non-repeatable 
constellation of highly disparate events, and contingent actions.5 Rather, my purpose here is to 
explore the extent to which the adoption of programmes of economic liberalisation and 
administrative decentralisation contributed to the process of breakdown in Venezuela. 
 
General thinking has been that liberalisation and decentralisation are part of a tandem of 
reforms that would spur economic recovery and growth and lead to more accountable 
transparent and effective governance. Even after the World Bank backed away from 
promoting radical structural adjustment programmes, it reaffirmed these basic propositions 
about the role of liberalisation in its so-called “capability approach”, which posited that “poor 
governance” is the result of an over-extended state relative to its institutional capacity at a 
given moment in time.6  While it is acknowledged that state-created rents and rent 
management systems, such as in industrial policy, may have worked in a handful of countries, 
especially in Northeast Asia, the advice for poorly performing Latin American economies 
would be “not to try this at home” since the administrative capacity to effectively administer 
subsidies, export ‘contests’ and investment co-ordination is generally lacking. Otherwise, the 
proponents of liberalisation would argue, there would not be so many infant industries that 
failed to ‘grow up’. In effect, the capability approach advocates that the  state’s role in the 
economy should be matched to its capability – a decidedly static and apolitical view of 
capacity. The capability approach implies that if the state can focus its scarce administrative 
skill in the ‘fundamental’ areas and leave production to the private sector, the overall 
management and governance effectiveness in the economy will increase.    Within Venezuela, 
liberal reformers in the second Pérez administration (1989-1993) also believed that the state 
did not, and importantly, could not, have the administrative capacity to construct a state- led 
developmental strategy. 7 This line of thinking is similar to what Hirschman referred to in 
Latin American policy circles as “fracasomania”, or the failure complex among Latin 
American leaders who insist that everything that has come before has been an utter failure.8 
 
In academic and policy circles within Venezuela, the main diagnoses of how to improve state 
capacity and governance in Venezuela were also driven by the insights of rent-seeking theory 
and its related variant, the rentier state model.  The main thrust of this literature claims that oil 
abundance induces an overly centralized, Soviet-style public authority and excessive state 
interventionism and discretion which, in turn causes growth-restricting and productivity-
restricting corruption and rent-seeking. 9 The idea that corruption has been the main obstacle 
                                                 
4 A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991; L. King, Does 
Neoliberalism Work? Comparing Economic and Sociological Explanations for Postcommunist  Performance, 
mimeo, Departmemt of Sociology, Yale University, 2004. 
5 A. O. Hirschman, ‘The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding’, World Politics, 22:3 (1970). 
6 World Bank, World Development Report: The State in a Changing World , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997, pp.61-75. 
7 M. Naím, Paper Tigers and Minotaurs: The Politics of Venezuela’s Economic Reforms, Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment Book, 1993. 
8 A. O. Hirschman, ‘Policymaking in Latin America’, in A. O. Hirschman, Essays in Trespassing: Economics to 
politics and beyond , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
9 Naím (1993); G. Torres, Quienes Ganan? Quienes Pierden?  Caracas: Banco Consolidado, 1993; T. L. Karl, 
The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro States, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. 
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to development and that state-created rents cause corruption became the intellectual pillar 
behind neo- liberal governance policies in general and the advocacy of economic liberalisation 
and political decentralisation in particular. From the lens of rent-seeking theory, the main aim 
of economic liberalisation is to reduce the discretionary centralised authority of state leaders 
to create rents. Governance reforms aim to promote transparency and accountability, which 
serve the same ends. At the same time, political reforms such as decentralisation and fiscal 
federalism aim to increase ‘civil society’ oversight and promote democracy, both of which 
have the dual function of reducing arbitrary rent allocation while also modernising and de-
personalising political relationships. 
 
In this article I suggest that economic liberalisation and political decentralisation has not 
strengthened the state as the capability approach predicted.   The idea that weak states will 
govern the economy better by intervening less – the so-called capability approach – has not 
been borne out by the trajectory of the Venezuelan economy. What is missing in the 
capability approach is an analysis of how capacity is cons tructed and, in particular, the role 
that political strategies of conflict resolution and competition play in constructing legitimate 
alternatives to failed state-led development projects. The ‘good governance paradigm’ 
promoted within the international development community downplays the task of 
reconstructing and/or building political organisations. This is because of the influence of the 
rent-seeking and corruption literature in informing policy on state capacity building and the 
negative view of politics that flows from that analysis.10 As a result, the governance agenda 
neglects the necessary role that political strategies play in state capacity building.  In this 
article I demonstrate how political analysis allows us to develop a more adequate account of 
the risks that reforms generate and to discuss the political sustainability of reforms. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 describes the liberalisation reforms 
and examines the domestic political support based for such reforms. Section 2 examines the 
economic and distributional impact of the reforms. The evidence suggests that liberalisation 
not only failed to revive private investment and economic growth, but also contributed to a 
worsening of the factorial distribution of income, which contributed to growing polarisation 
of politics. The causes and consequences of the failure of the state to regulate the banking 
system are also discussed. Section 3 examines the political processes through which 
neoliberal reforms contributed to political instability and the increased use of the corruption 
scandal as a weapon of political and economic competition. Particular attention is paid to the 
role of policy switches and party-neglecting strategies among the reformers. Section 4 briefly 
suggests why neoliberalism generated greater political instability and decline in state capacity 
in Venezuela compared to some other Latin American reforming economies. The Conclusion 
explores the theoretical and policy implications of the Venezuelan experience.  
 
 
The Economic Liberalisation Package of 1989  
In 1989, Carlos Andres Pérez launched one of the most ambitious liberalization reforms in 
Latin America.  The liberalization plan, known as the “Great Turnaround” (“El Gran Viraje”), 
                                                 
10 The mainstream view of politics has been greatly influenced by a negative view of the state. For instance, 
models of the welfare state pioneered by Pigou have been replaced by models, which view the state as either 
“predator” (D. North, Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: Norton, 1981), “bandit” (M. 
Olson, ‘Dictatorship, Democracy and Development’, American Political Science Review, 87 (1993)), “populist” 
(R. Dornbusch & S. Edwards (eds), Economic Populism in Latin America, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1990), or “grabbing hand” (A. Shleifer & R. Vishny, The Grabbing Hand, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1998). 
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included the unification, and massive devaluation of the exchange rate, trade liberalization, 
privatisation and financial deregulation, including freeing of interest rates, elimination of 
nearly all restrictions on foreign investment, and the introduction of tax reforms, including the 
introduction of value-added taxes.11 Indeed, the reforms represented a turnaround. Since the 
transition and consolidation of democracy in 1958, Venezuela had historically been 
legitimated by the state- led developmentalism, economic nationalism, a spirit of anti-
imperialism, 12 with centralised rent deployment patterns controlled by the executive and 
brokered by two hegemonic and highly centralised and clientelist political parties.13 The 
programme was intended to be an orthodox reform package along the lines of the Washington 
Consensus.14 Its chief architect, Planning Minister Miguel Rodríguez, envisioned that 
Venezuela, in economic terms, would follow the post-1982 Chilean model of neoliberal 
reform.15  While ‘big push’ industrial policies were discredited, there seemed to be little 
caution amongst the Venezuelan economic reform team that an equally ambitious ‘big push’ 
liberalisation programme could be carried out. This lack of caution was bold given that 
Venezuela had suffered in the previous decade from an increasingly ineffective state 
apparatus and party system, and had considerable fewer oil export revenues per capita to 
compensate the losers of the reform programme (see data on declines in oil exports below). 
 
The impetus to these policies was a balance of payments crisis in 1988. The previous three 
years of the Lusinchi administration (1986-88) were characterised by populist macro 
management. The maintenance of several price controls and a multiple exchange rate regime 
were sources of corruption and distortions.  In these years, the fiscal deficit averaged 7.6 
percent of GDP. By 1988, inflation had reached 30 percent in an economy with historically 
very low inflation. The deficit on the current account had reached 9.9 percent of GDP and net 
international reserves were negative $US 6.2 billion. 16 As with many structural adjustment 
programmes, macroeconomic stabilisation was combined with economic liberalisation even 
though there is little evidence that it is either prudent or necessary to implement both 
simultaneously.17 Restoring macroeconomic balances in the exchange rates or in fiscal 
accounts does not imply that trade liberalisation will improve export performance or 
productivity growth in a late developer. 
 
Apart from balance of payments crisis in 1989, there were economic and political factors that 
contributed to a sea change in Perez’s policy stance.  Firstly, the long-run growth performance 
                                                 
11 For details, see R. Hausmann, ‘Quitting Populism Cold Turkey’, in L. Goodman, J. Forman, M. Naím, J. 
Tulchin and G. Bland. (eds), Lessons from the Venezuelan Experience, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1995; J. Corrales & I. Cisneros, ‘Corporatism, Trade Liberalization and Sectoral Responses: The Case of 
Venezuela, 1989-1999’, World Development, 27 (1999); M. A. Rodríguez, El Impacto de la Política Económica 
en el Proceso de Desearollo Venezolano, Caracas: Universidad Santa Maria, 2002. 
12 F. Coronil, The Magical State, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
13 Ironically, in the first Pérez administration (1974-1978), the government attempted one of the largest state-led 
‘big push’ natural-resource-based industrialisation programmes in Latin America, a programme that was known 
as La Gran Venezuela (Karl, 1997, pp.143-160; J. Di John, Mineral Resource Rents, Rent-Seeking and State 
Capacity in a Late Developer: The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Venezuela 1920-1998 , PhD 
dissertation, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics and Politics, 2004, pp.137-147). 
14 J. Williamson, ‘What Washington Means by Policy Reform’, in Williamson, J. (ed.), Latin American 
Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?  Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1990. 
15 Interview with Miguel Rodríguez, June 2003. Rodríguez failed to point out two important differences between 
1989 Venezuela and post-1982 Chile.  First, the latter was an authoritarian regime that had severely weakened 
the power of political parties and labour unions. Moreover, there was broad support for neoliberal reforms 
among the opposition parties in Chile, whereas there was little support in Ve nezuela for such reforms.  
16 Rodríguez (2002), p.39. 
17 D. Rodrik, ‘Understanding Economic Policy Reform’, Journal of Economic Literature, (March 1996). 
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of the Venezuelan economy and its state- led industrial strategy was becoming increasingly 
poor. In the period 1973-1988, gross domestic product per capita declined 15 percent. 
Secondly, declines in oil exports per capita further restricted the resources for patronage and 
induced many actors, such as labour unions and business chambers, to clamour for changes as 
well as reduce their loyalty to the party system, which was central to the distribution of oil 
rents.18 In the period 1950-1980, real exports per capita averaged $1,550 (in 2000 dollars), but 
declined to $1,150 in the period 1980-1990. Within this trend decline in oil exports per capita, 
oil prices collapsed by 50 percent in 1986, which translated into oil exports per capita 
plummeting to an annual average of less than $600 per capita in the period 1986-1988.  
Sudden declines in commodity prices seemed to have added to the sense of ‘fracasomania’, as 
it underlined the vulnerabilities of export dependence on oil. 
 
Politically, there was increasing domestic pressure from the mid-1980s onwards from 
influential business groups, who were advocating economic liberalisation as a way to increase 
economic efficiency and to reduce the dominance of the state and political parties over 
resource allocation. 19 One manifestation of this pressure was the Grupo Roraima (a group of 
influential business leaders, academics and consultants), which produced a series of 
influential documents, particularly the Proposal for the Country in 1984, critiquing state- led 
development policies and calling for radical change.20 Secondly, Perez’s policy conversion to 
neoliberalism may have been influenced by the large-scale campaign contributions and close 
relationships with economic groups who expected to benefit from the new rent opportunities 
that privatisation and liberalisation would bring. 21 Thirdly, Pérez was greatly influenced by 
the emergence of an elite group of academics (mostly economists and business administration 
experts trained in US universities) that had no party affiliation and generally were champions 
                                                 
18 M. Penfold-Becerra, ‘El colapso del sistema de partidos en Venezuela: explicación de una muerte anunciada’, 
in J.V. Carrasquero, T. Maingnon and F. Welsch (eds), Venezuela en transición: elecciones y democracia 1998-
2000, Caracas: CDB publicaciones, 2001. 
19 While the neoclassical political economy, and in particular, rent-seeking theory links domestic pressure to the 
creation of state-led interventions, there is much less analysis of the role that interest groups play in inducing the 
state to withdraw from governing the economy (H. E. Schamis, ‘Distributional Coalitions and the politics of 
economic reform in Latin America’, World Politics, 51 (1999)). 
20 Grupo Roraima, Proposición al país, Caracas: Grupo Roraima, 1984. For a discussion of Grupo Roraima, see 
R. De la Cruz, Venezuela en Busca de un Nuevo Pacto Social, Caracas: Alfadil Ediciones, 1988, pp.71-80. 
21 Interview with Gumersindo Rodriguez, June 2003. See M. Coppedge, ‘Venezuelan Parties and the 
Representation of Elite Interests’, in K. J. Middlebrook (ed.), Conservative Parties, the Right and Democracy in 
Latin America, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000, on the role of campaign contributions in 
influencing policy decisions.  The economic groups close to the Pérez administration were popularly known as 
the “Twelve Apostles” (a term coined by P. Duno, Los doce apósteles, Valencia: Vadell Hermanos, 1975), many 
of who came, like Pérez from the Andean region. The ties between President Pérez and the Apostles were forged 
during his struggle to assume the Acción Democrática (AD) presidential candidacy in 1973, when Pérez’s own 
isolation in AD and lack of control over the party hierarchy convinced him of the necessity of establishing a 
power and financial base outside the party machinery. The names of these businessmen appear in many of the 
financially most lucrative contracts awarded in the period 1974-1978 (T. L. Karl, The Political Economy of 
Petrodollars: Oil and Democracy in Venezuela, unpublished PhD dissertation, Department of Political Science, 
Stanford University.  University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor Michigan, 1982, pp.463-512). To Pérez 
and his faction of AD, the Apostles represented an attempt to democratise capital by breaking the hegemony of 
traditional large family business groups. Pérez’s reliance on the Apostles probably increased by 1989, since he 
was even less favoured by the central executive committee of his own party, AD, than in 1973. The two most 
influential figures were probably Pedro Tinoco, who owned one of the largest banks, Banco Latino and who 
became President of the Central Bank in 1989, and Diego Cisneros, head of the Cisneros Group, which became 
the most successful group by the 1990s, and was one of the few groups to develop extensive commercial 
holdings internationally. 
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of radical, neoliberal reform. 22 When elected many of the key positions in the cabinet were 
given to these academics, most of whom worked in the country’s leading business school, the 
Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (Institute of Higher Administration 
Studies, IESA). This group of ministers were called the ‘IESA Boys’ in Venezuela, analogous 
to the ‘Chicago Boys’ in Pinochet’s Chile.23 Finally, while international agencies like the 
World Bank, IMF, and Inter-American Development Bank, greatly supported neoliberal 
reforms throughout the region, there is little evidence that, in 1989, these organisations were 
putting pressure on the Venezuelan state to contemplate an ambitious liberalisation 
programme. Thus, the reform team had a high degree of ‘ownership’ over the programme, 24 
though it is the case that once the state went to IMF and World Bank for structural adjustment 
loans, the programmes were orthodox in nature. 
 
The most rapid liberalisation reforms took place in trade policy. It became well known that 
the protection system did not have clear performance criteria guidelines. The perpetual 
protection of infants that fail to grow up became the norm.25  The trade liberalisation for 
industry was the most rapid in Latin America at the time, and profound. The maximum tariff 
was reduced from 135 percent, one the highest in the region, to 20 percent by 1992. By 1993, 
average tariffs declined further to 10 percent, one of the lowest levels of trade dispersion 
among Latin America’s major liberalisers. Average tariffs were dropped from 37 percent 
overall and 61 percent for finished goods in 1988 to 16 percent and 26 percent respectively in 
the period 1991-1993.26 The non-tariff barrier coverage declined from an average of 44 
percent in the period 1985-1987 to less than 5 percent, one of the lowest rates among major 
Latin American trade liberalisers, in 1991-1992.27 In terms of political reform, important 
institutional reforms in decentralisation were undertaken. These included elimination of 
political party slates and the installation of direct elections for governors and legislators at the 
state and municipal levels including the devolution of power in health and education sectors.28 
There were also significant changes in intergovernmental fiscal transfers. In 1989, transfers 
from the central government to regional governments were raised from 15 percent to 20 
percent; in 1994, governors and mayors were to receive 10 percent of all value-added taxes, a 
percentage that was to rise to 30 percent over the subsequent five years.29 
 
Indeed, the decision to implement the liberalisation programme was clearly based on the idea 
that the regulatory structure of the state had become the principal contributor to stagnation in 
                                                 
22 J. C. Navarro, ‘Venezuela’s New Political Actors’, in L. Goodman, J. Forman, M. Naím, J. Tulchin and G. 
Bland (eds.), Lessons from the Venezuelan Experience , Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, p.127. 
23 Coppedge (2000), p.128. 
24 This point was corroborated in both my interview with Miguel Rodriguez, and in an interview (Feb. 2004) 
with Anthony Elson, who worked for the IMF, during the structural adjustment loans of 1989. Of course, while 
the reform team may have ‘owned’ the programme, there was little evidence that the majority of the population 
would support the reforms.  
25 World Bank, Venezuela: Industrial Sector Report, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990, p.19. 
26 Corrales & Cisneros (1999), p.2103. 
27 S. Edwards, ‘Trade and Industrial Policy Reform in Latin America’, in A.L. Resende (ed.), Policies for 
Growth: The Latin American Experience. Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1995, p.200. According to Cisneros & 
Corrales (1999), p.2102), the number of import licenses granted by the state declined from 2,204 (representing 
nearly 48 percent of manufacturing production) to less than 140 in 1992 (affecting approximately 2 percent of 
manufacturing production). 
28 R. De la Cruz (ed.), Federalismo fiscal y decentralización, Caracas: Edciones IESA, 1997; M. Grindle, 
Audacious Reforms, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000, pp.37-93. 
29 M. Penfold-Becerra, ‘Federalism and Institutional Change in Venezuela’, paper presented at the American 
Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Boston, 2002, pp.19-20. 
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Venezuela.30 The abundance of resources available and relatively high investment rates in 
Venezuela over long periods would strongly suggest that the problem of poor long-run growth 
has been, at least in part, a problem of inefficient resource management and hence incentive 
structures at all levels of Venezuelan society.  The institutional collapse of the state apparatus 
was argued to be a sufficient reason for the state to “abdicate power” and let decentralized 
private agents assume control of coordinating economic activity. 31 This logic is broadly 
similar to the capability approach of the ‘governance’ paradigm.32  What was not 
communicated to the public, however, was why a rich oil country with three years of rapid 
growth in the period 1986-88 needed such harsh structural adjustment. 
 
 
Neo-Liberal Reforms and Economic Performance 
The Venezuelan experience with economic liberalisation in the period 1989 until the 
emergence of Hugo Chávez as president in 1998 calls into question many of the predictions of 
the good governance paradigm, the capability approach and the models of rent-seeking and 
corruption upon which both are based.33 It also calls into question the validity of rentier state 
predictions.34   The period 1989-1998 was marked not only by the continued stagnation of 
output and productivity growth, but there was a growing perception that corruption had not 
only not declined, but was, in fact, increasing.35 
 
 
Table 1 Growth Trends in the Venezuelan Economy, 1920-2002 
(average annual growth rates*, %) 
 Non-oil GDP Manufacturing 
1920-30 10.2 n.a 
1930-40 2.7 n.a 
1940-50 9.6 6.6 
1950-57 9.1 15.0 
1957-65 3.4 8.5 
1965-80 5.7 5.8 
1980-90 -0.1 4.3 
1990-98 2.3 1.5 
1998-2002 -1.9 -5.0 
Notes: * all output series in 1984 bolivares 
Source: Baptista (1997); Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV), Annual Reports, Caracas, various years 
 
                                                 
30 Naím (1993). 
31 Cordiplan, El Gran Viraje , Caracas, 1990. 
32 World Bank (1997). 
33 See World Bank (1997), pp.61-77, on the capability approach; and Naím (1993) and M. Naím & A. Francés, 
‘The Venezuelan Private Sector: From Courting the State to Courting the Market’, in L. Goodman, J. Forman, 
M. Naím, J. Tulchin and G. Bland (eds), Lessons from the Venezuelan Experience, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1995, for a mainstream discussion of the negative effects of rent-seeking in the Venezuelan 
context. 
34 As developed, for example in Karl (1997). 
35 Di John (2004), Table 3.2, p.87. Based on Transparency International subjective corruption indices (an index 
of 10 minimum corruption, an index of 0 indicates maximum corruption), Venezuela’s corruption index 
worsened from 3.3 in the period 1980-85 to 2.5 in the period 1992-1995. See D. Treisman, ‘The Causes of 
Corruption: A Cross National Study’, Journal of Public Economics, 76 (2000) for a critical discussion the 
methodology underlying the construction of the Transparency International indices. 
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Per capita gross domestic product declined 2.7 percent in the liberalisation period, 1990-1998.  
In the non-oil economy, economic liberalisation did not reverse the long-run decline in either 
non-oil GDP or in manufacturing growth (see Table 1). 
 
Manufacturing growth, which had been on a downward trend since the mid-1960s, declined 
from an annual average of 4.3 percent in the period 1980-1990 to 1.5 percent in the reform era 
of 1990-1998, and collapsed to minus 5 percent in the period 1998-2002.36  Non-oil annual 
growth did increase from minus 0.1 percent in the period 1980-1990 to 2.3 percent in the 
period 1990-1998.  However, this rate was still well below the growth rate in the previous 
three decades and collapsed again to minus 1.9 percent in the period 1998-2002. 
 
Moreover, there was continued decline in total investment and particularly private sector 
investment as indicated in Table 2: 
 
 
Table 2: Gross Fixed Investment Rates: Venezuela, 1950-1998 
(annual average as percentage of GDP and non-oil GDP respectively in current prices, %) 
 All investment Non-oil investment 
 (as % GDP) (as % non-oil GDP) 
 Total Public Private Total Public Private 
1950-60 27.7 10.5 17.2 34.8 16.9 17.8 
1960-70 24.2 8.4 15.8 26.1 9.1 17.0 
1970-80 34.4 10.8 23.6 36.8 9.6 27.2 
1980-90 21.3 10.6 10.7 22.5 8.7 13.8 
1990-98* 15.8 9.9 6.9 13.7 5.6 8.1 
Note: * non-oil investment data for the period 1990-95 only 
Source: Baptista (1997); (BCV), Annual Reports, various years; BCV (1982); Oficina Central de Estadísticas e 
Información (OCEI), various years. 
 
Investment rates, particularly private investment rates, in the 1990s were significantly lower 
than in any period since 1950. The non-oil public investment rates in the 1990s were also 
lower than at any period since 1950, which also suggests that the effectiveness of the state in 
mobilizing resources did not increase as a result of economic reforms.  The model of state 
abdication has not, in the Venezuelan case, led to a more secure environment in which to 
invest. Finally, the move toward decentralisation in the 1990s (through the creation of 
municipal and state elections and the transfer of service provision in health and education to 
state governments) has not led to significant to improvements in governance at the local and 
state level. 37 
 
                                                 
36 The socio-economic effects of long-run economic stagnation, which neoliberal reforms did not reverse, have 
been devastating.  Firstly, there has been a dramatic decline in average real wages, which in 1995, had already 
fallen below the levels attained in 1950 (Baptista, Bases cuantitativas de la economía venezolana 1830-1995, 
Caracas: Fundación Polar, 1997, Table IV-1, p.145).  In the period, 1995-1998, real wages declined by 4.01 
percent per year. Prolonged stagnation has led to a significant increase in the incidence of poverty. The 
percentage of households below the poverty line was 20 percent in the 1980-81. The share of poor households 
increased to 36 percent in 1985-86; 42 percent in 1989-90; 51 percent in 1994-95; and 56.4 percent in 1998-2000 
(G. Márquez & C. Alvarez, , Poverty and the Labour Mark et in Venezuela 1982-1995, Washington, D.C.: Social 
Programs Division, Inter-American Development Bank, 1996). 
37 Grindle (2000), pp.37-93. 
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While investment has stagna ted, there has been a massive shift in the factor distribution of 
income in favour of profits and away from wages in the liberalization period, as indicated in 
Table 3: 
 
Table 3: Net Factor Distribution of National Income in Venezuela 1950-1998 
 
 
Share of wages and 
salaries in national 
income (annual average, 
percent) 
Share of corporate 
profits, dividends, rents 
and interest payments in 
national income (annual 
average percent) 
1950-1960 47% 53% 
1960-1970 46% 54% 
1970-1980 49% 51% 
1980-1988 46% 54% 
1989-1998 36% 64% 
Source: BCV, Statistical Series, various years 
 
 
The share of corporate profits, rents and dividends oscillated between 51 percent and 54 
percent in the period 1950-1988.  However, in the liberalisation period of 1989-1998, capital 
owners appropriated an annual average of 64 percent of national income.  Despite the fact that 
capitalist surplus appropriation and rents were increasing, private sector investment rates 
declined in the 1990s. In fact, much of the increased surplus appropriation went abroad as 
accumulated capital flight, which reached $14 billion in the period 1994-2000. Capital flight 
was nearly the same as the accumulated surplus in the current account of the balance-of-
payments ($15 billion) in the same period.38  
 
While liberalisation has been associated with a dramatic decline in labour’s factorial share, it 
is not possible to conclude definitively that liberalisation caused this decline. There are, as 
Rodríguez points out, important feedback effects to consider.39  On the one hand, labour 
unions had weakened prior to the liberalisation period.  In 1975, the rate of unionisation was 
33 percent, but fell to 26.4 percent by 1988 owing to economic stagnation and decline.  
Moreover, the ties between the main labour-based party, AD, and the main labour federation 
(the Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela, CTV) weakened throughout the 1980s.40 
Labour’s weakened political power contributed to the decline in its bargaining power over 
factorial shares. One the other hand, the liberalisation policies clearly exacerbated this trend 
as lower factor shares along with weak demand for labour owing to stagnant investment 
further weakened labour’s power.  In the period 1988-1995, the rate of unionisation fell by 
                                                 
38 Rodríguez (2002), p.67. Massive capital flight became a feature of the Venezuelan economy from 1979 
onwards.  In the period 1979-1983, capital flight amounted to $29.2 billion, which was larger than the public 
sector debt of $27 billion accumulated by 1983! See M. A. Rodriguez, ‘Pubic Sector Behaviour in Venezuela’, in 
F. Larraín and M. Selowsky (eds), The Public Sector and the Latin American Crisis, San Francisco: International 
Center for Economic Growth, 1991, and Di John (2004), pp.178-184, for a discussion of the policy failures and 
distributive conflicts underlying the growth in capital flight-cum debt crisis.   
39 F. Rodríguez, ‘Factor Shares and Resource Booms: Accounting for the Evolution of Venezuelan Inequality’, 
WIDER Working Paper, 205 (2000), pp.35-36. 
40 Roberts (2003), pp.60-61. 
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nearly 50 percent, declining from 26.4 percent of the workforce in 1988 to 13.5 percent in 
1995.41  
 
The worsening of distribution contributed to the growing polarization of politics. Such 
divisiveness was manifested in increasing factionalism within and between the political 
parties and declining support among the poor for economic reforms.42  The severity of the 
growing polarisation was manifested in the widespread support among the poor for two 
military coup attempts in 1992, the first of which was the military rebellion of Hugo Chávez,  
whose popularity was based on the stressing injustices of the neo- liberal model. 43 Growing 
inequality was also the focal point of Rafael Caldera’s famous speech in Congress in 1992, 
where he condemned the actions of the coup plotters, but emphasized that the discontent of 
the military officers was a fair reflection of the injustices of the neo- liberal programme.  This 
speech revived Caldera’s political image (he was president in the period 1968-1973).  
 
While some analysts have hailed the full implementation of trade liberalisation as a 
remarkable political achievement,44 the liberalisation period, as indicated in Table 1, failed to 
revive economic growth. The decline in manufacturing growth was particularly disappointing. 
In 1989, the first year of the ‘Great Turnaround’ plan, there was a dramatic decline in 
manufacturing output of 14.5 percent.  In the period 1988-1998, manufacturing growth 
declined and was widespread across sectors (see Table 4).  Only seven out of twenty-five 
sectors registered positive growth rates over the period, and most of the sectors that did 
register growth were in low-technology or limited growth technology sectors (i.e. food 
products, non-ferrous metals) natural-resource processing or were in turn-key assembly- line 
sectors with little technology transfer (i.e. autos). 
 
 
                                                 
41 Roberts (2002), p. 61, using data from International Labour Organisation (ILO), World Labour Report 1997-
98. Geneva: ILO, 1997, p.235.  Accompanying the decline in labour union membership was an increase in 
informal employment in the liberalisation period. In the period 1980-90, the rate of informal employment of the 
non-agricultural labour force averaged 39.5 percent.  However, the level of informal employment increased to an 
average of 44.5 percent in the period 1991-1995, with a tendency toward continued increases as the sub-period 
1994-1995 saw informality rates reach an average of 48.5 percent (based on data from Central Office of 
Statistics and Information (OCEI), Household Surveys and Employment Surveys, various years). The 
consequence of growing fragmentation and informalisation of the labour and production process negatively 
affected the social bases of support for political parties, and hence contributed to the de-institutionalisation of 
conflict mediation capacities in the Venezuelan polity. It also meant that populist/outsider strategies become 
more likely to be effective political strategies. It is perhaps no accident that the two subsequent political leaders -
Caldera and Chávez - relied on anti-politico/outsider discourses and less on corporatist modes of intermediation 
that characterised Venezuela’s pacted democracy in the past. 
42 Roberts (2003). Naím (1993) explains political instability in terms of the failure in the communication 
strategy of the Pérez administration to inform the poor and middle class the benefits of reform.  This line of 
reasoning underestimates the distributional impact the liberalisation model itself.  Polling evidence from the 
period 1989-1991 suggests that the poor strata were much less likely to support the reforms than upper income 
groups (Roberts, 2003, p.63). 
43 See D. Canache, Venezuela: Public Opinion and Protest in a Fragile Democracy, Coral Gables, FL.: North-
South Center, 2002, for evidence on the poor’s support for the military coup as well as their continued support 
for Chávez in the period 1992-2000. 
44 Corrales & Cisneros (1999), p.2099. 
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Table 4. Growth Rates in Venezuelan Manufacturing 1988-1998 
(average annual growth in gross output, %) 
All manufacturing     -1.8% 
362 glass products 6.4%  
361 pottery, ceramics 5.7%  
351 industrial chemicals 3.2%  
311 food products 2.8%  
384 transport equipment 2.4%  
372 non-ferrous products 1.8%  
356 plastic products 1.5%  
324 footwear 0.3%  
321 textiles -0.4%  
313 beverages -1.2%  
342 printing & publishing -2.5%  
354 petroleum derivatives -3.2%  
369 non-metallic minerals -3.7%  
382 non-electric machinery -4.1%  
371 iron and steel -4.6%  
383 electrical machinery -5.4%  
332 wood furniture -6.0%  
341 Pulp, paper -6.1%  
355 rubber products -6.5%  
352 Other chemical products -6.6%  
381 fabricated metal products -7.6%  
323 leather products -7.7%  
322 Apparel -8.4%  
390 other manufacturing  -9.0%  
314 tobacco                                         -9.3% 
Source: OCEI, various years; BCV, Statistic Series, various years 
 
 
Economic liberalisation has also induced changes in manufacturing product specialisation that 
are unlikely to enhance long-run productivity growth and technological development.  Table 5 
illustrates the extent to which the relative shares of manufacturing sectors with different 
technological characteristics have changed in the period 1970-1998.  
 
 
Table 5. Structure of Manufacturing Value -Added in Venezuela, 1970, 1990, 1996, 1998* 
 Sectors  1970 1990 1996 1998 
I 5.3 12.4 11.2 11.0 
II 5.1 1.7 2.3 3.0 
III+IV 52.8 55.4 61.3 60.3 
V 33.2 30.4 25.3 25.8 
* Notes: Following Katz  (2000), pp.1591-1592, the groups used here are as follows: I. metalworking and  
engineering-intensive industries; except motor vehicles (ISIC 381, 382, 383, 385); II. Motor vehicles 
(ISIC 384);  III. Food, beverages and tobacco (ISIC 311, 312, 313); IV. Natural-resource processing 
industries (ISIC 341, 351, 354, 355, 356,371, 372); V. labour-intensive industries (ISIC 321, 322, 323, 
324, 331, 332, 342, 352, 361, 362, 361, 390). 
Source:  OCEI, various years  
 
 
Following the classification by Katz, Group I are technology- intensive sectors where 
productivity growth is likely to be greatest. Group II is the motor-vehicle sector where growth 
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is generally dependent on the extent to which foreign direct investment is active. Groups III 
and IV are the capital- intensive sectors of food processing and natural-resource production. 
Group V are generally low-technology, labour- intensive sectors such as footwear.45 
 
There are several important trends to consider. First, the technology- intensive sectors (I) 
increased from a low base before economic liberalization. Thereafter, their share in total 
manufacturing value-added (MVA) decreases slightly from 12.4 percent in 1990 to 11.0 in 
1998. Thus, all of the increase in technology- intensive sectors occurs in the era of 
protectionism. The share of group I sectors in Venezuela by 1996 is similar to other medium-
sized Latin American countries such as Chile and Colombia.46 Second, liberalisation has 
induced a further specialisation in the capital- intensive sectors of foodstuffs and natural-
resource processing. The share in MVA of groups III and IV increased from 55.4 in 1990 to 
60.3 percent. The centrality of these sectors in product specialisation limits employment 
creation, increases the  investment requirements of production and is only modestly dynamic 
in terms of technological development. Once again, Venezuela’s focus on foodstuffs and 
natural-resource production is similar to the Latin American pattern in the 1990s.47 Third, a 
somewhat surprising outcome of liberalisation is a decline in the share of the labour- intensive 
sectors. The group V share in MVA declines from 30.4 percent to 25.8 percent in 1998. One 
of the main ideas in the Washington Consensus was that devaluation, by reducing wage costs, 
would induce more labour-intensive production.  This has clearly not happened in Venezuela; 
nor has it happened more generally in Latin America in the 1990s. 
 
In sum, the liberalisation period has not generally promoted shifts in production that are either 
productivity-enhancing or favourable for employment creation in Venezuela.  The high levels 
of service sector production, which tends to be more informal and less unionisable, also 
affected the social bases of support for political parties.  As indicated in Table 6, the 
economic liberalisation period has seen slight increases in already high levels of ‘premature 
tertiarisation’: 
 
 
 
Table 6: Structural Change in Composition of Non-Oil National Product: 
Venezuela 1950-1998 
(at 1984 prices and expressed as % of non-oil GDP) 
 Agriculture  Manufacturing 
Rest of 
Industry* Services 
1950 8 8 22 52 
1960 6 15 24 55 
1973 7 16 17 60 
1981 6 18 17 59 
1990 6 20 10 64 
1995 6 19 14 61 
1998 6 20 10 64 
Note: * refers to construction, mining and electric ity and water sectors 
Source: BCV, Statistical Series, various years 
 
                                                 
45 J. Katz, ‘Structural Change and Labour Productivity Growth in Latin American Manufacturing Industries 
1970-1996’, World Development, 28:2 (2000), p.1591. 
46 Katz (2000), p.1592. 
47 Katz (2000), p.1592. 
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The consequence of growing fragmentation and informalisation of the labour and production 
process means that populist/outsider strategies become more likely to be effective political 
strategies.  It is thus no accident that the two subsequent political leaders – Caldera and 
Chávez – relied on anti-political discourses and less on corporatist modes of intermediation 
that characterised Venezuela’s pacted democracy in the past. 
 
While economic liberalisation policies may have provided increased discipline over producers 
compared with the previous era of protectionism, it did not provide the incentives for firms to 
engage in re-structuring. There are several reasons for this. First, the rapid trade liberalisation 
left many firms with little time to compete with lower priced imports. Second, financial 
deregulation led to a drastic increase in interest rates. Bank loan rates, which were fixed at 
often-negative real rates, averaged 12 percent in the 1980s. In 1989, with financial 
deregulation, the loan rate jumped dramatically to 34 percent and averaged 45 percent in the 
period 1990-1998.48 The average ratio of bank credits to GDP in the period 1989-1993 
declined to 31.3 percent, nearly one-half the ratio of 52.6 percent in 1988.49 Third, credit to 
manufacturing firms, particularly small and medium declined dramatically and was 
instrumental in weakening political support from parts of the business community for the neo-
liberal reform. In the context of trade liberalisation and economic stagnation, many of the 
family conglomerate groups engaged in manufacturing were dismantled,50 and many smaller 
operations were forced into bankruptcy. There is little evidence that competitive pressures 
were providing growth-enhancing and productivity-enhancing producer incentives. 
 
In addition to lagging growth and investment in the liberalisation period, the inability of the 
state to effectively regulate the banking system was a powerful indication that a smaller state 
does not necessarily produce a state capable of managing ‘fundamental’ regulatory functions 
effectively. Venezuela experienced a major collapse of the banking sector as severe as the 
worst in recent economic times, including financial crises in East Asia. The lack of 
supervisory and regulatory mechanisms and blatant theft of government bailout funds by 
bankers (estimated at nearly $US 7 billion) in the form of capital flight led to large-scale bank 
closings and government takeover of many of the economy's largest commercial banks in 
1994 and 1995.  The bailout cost the government the equivalent of 18 percent of GDP, the 
fifth most severe banking crisis in the world during the period 1975-1995.51 The main cause 
of this crisis was the weakness of the state vis-à-vis financial groups and its inability to 
impose effective banking supervision, regulation and enforcement of fraudulent practices in 
the financial liberalisation period.52 Some of the leverage that large financial groups had 
derived from the large campaign contributions many made to the Pérez presidential 
campaign.53 Moreover, the financial groups were able to resist opening the banking system to 
                                                 
48 R. De Krivoy, Colaspo del Sistema Bancaria Venezolana de 1994, Caracas: Ediciones IESA, 2002, p.308. 
49 De Krivoy (2002), pp.55-56. 
50 A. Francés, ‘Qué le paso a la empresa venezolana en los noventa?’, Debates IESA, 3 (2001). 
51 World Bank (1997), p.68. 
52 De Krivoy (2002). 
53 Coppedge (2000). The appointment of Pedro Tinoco (one of Pérez’s Twelve Apostles) as Central Bank 
President was indicative of the power of the financial community and the degree of cronyism between the 
executive and some big financial groups.  Tinoco owned Banco Latino, which went from the fifth largest to 
second largest bank in the period 1989-1993.  Banco Latino became the largest holder of government treasury 
bonds, one of the more lucrative enterprises in the banking sector. The lack of banking regulation permitted 
Latino and other banks to engage in self-loans, and transfer large amounts of deposits offshore. By 1993, 70 
percent of all bank’s assets were self-loans (De Krivoy, 2002, p.165). 
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foreign competition and takeover until 1995.54 In the period 1989-1992, the annual budget of 
the banking regulation board amounted to a paltry $8,000 per private financial institution.  
This amount was equivalent to the annual salary of a middle level manager.55 Weak state 
capacity in this case was not simply ‘inherited’, as the capability approach would have it, but 
was the result of the political power of financial groups able to resist changes in the regulatory 
system and to resist implementation of already existing laws.  
 
 
Neo-Liberal Reforms, Corruption and Political Instability 
The liberalisation period also produced uncertainty and political tension, and increased in the 
perception that corruption had worsened. The sudden deregulation led to a frenzy of what 
Naím refers to as “oligopolistic wars” among business groups vying for control over raw 
material supplies, financing, and distribution channels.56 The rapid dismantling of trade 
protection and a decline in state-business cooperation had no counterpart in trust and ‘social 
capital’ of inter-conglomerate networks. The particularistic nature of the ‘politics of privilege’ 
between the state and business groups meant that business and industrial chamber associations 
lacked effective collective institutions. In the context of weak judicial and regulatory 
mechanisms, these wars turned into nasty battles undertaken in the media as business groups 
aggressively invested in newspapers, magazines, and radio and television stations. According 
to Naím and Francés, there reached a point where no major media enterprise was independent 
from a major private conglomerate group.57 The limited social capital of business groups 
clearly intensified a ‘war of positions’ within the private sector that added greatly to the 
atmosphere of political and social instability that marked the liberalisation era of the 1990s. 
Neo-liberalism, if anything, created the setting for increases in mafia- like activity to 
appropriate the large rents that suddenly emerged with deregulation. 
 
The manner in which economic liberalisation was introduced also de-stabilised the polity. 
Pérez, elected in a landslide, had been president in the period 1974-1979, and many voters 
associated him with a period of prosperity and state largesse. Neither Pérez nor his party, 
Acción Democrática, stressed during the campaign that rapid and profound reforms were 
planned, though there were policy documents that indicated that some market reforms would 
be initiated.58  By ‘hiding’ his policy intentions, Perez was one among many ‘first generation’ 
reformers in Latin America such as Salinas in Mexico, Fujimori in Peru and Menem in 
Argentina, that introduced economic reforms in the early 1990s despite running a campaign 
that ‘hid’ policy reform intentions. This misrepresentation of policy intention during the 
campaign – essentially deceiving the electorate – was to prove damaging to the long-standing 
consultation process in the Venezuelan polity. 59  
                                                 
54 The banking crisis of 1994 left Venezuelan banks’ book values at historic lows. In the period 1995-1998, a 
wave of foreign investment followed in the banking sector led by two leading Spanish banks, Banco Santander 
Central Hispano (BSCH) and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA). The increase in market share of 
foreign-owned banks went from less than 2 percent in 1994 to over 40 percent by 1999 (World Bank, World 
Development Report: Building Institutions for Markets , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p.89). 
55 De Krivoy (2002), p.30. 
56 Naím (1993), pp.95-100. 
57 Naím & Francés (1995). 
58 Stambouli (2002), pp.175-176. 
59 The second major policy switch in the period under study occurred in 1996 when Rafael Caldera, who won 
the Presidency in 1993 running on an anti-corruption, anti-neoliberal campaign, abandoned two years of price 
and capital controls and endorsed the Agenda Venezuela, a structural adjustment package with IMF support.  
The policy switch did only not reverse economic stagnation, it led to a further disillusionment with the party 
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Hiding reform intentions exacerbated the ‘shock’ to the public when economic liberalisation 
therapy was actually introduced. A few weeks after the announcement of reforms, Venezuela 
experienced its bloodiest urban riots since urban guerrilla warfare in the 1960s.  The riots, 
known as the Caracazo, occurred in late February 1989.  A doubling of gasoline prices, which 
were passed on by private bus companies, induced the outbursts. The government had 
actually announced that bus fares were allowed to rise by 30 percent, but did not monitor the 
increases bus companies were charging.  Moreover, bus drivers ignored discounts to student 
prices.60 The riots that ensued were contained by a relatively undisciplined military response 
that left more than 350 dead in two days. Although never documented, there are many 
informal accounts that point to left-wing organisations that mobilised groups to incite riots 
when gas prices were increased.61 
 
The way in which liberalisation reforms were decided was also divisive. Pérez decided to 
completely abandon consultations with large rival factions within his party, AD, and 
introduced reforms by relying on insulated technocratic decision-making. Since 1958, 
Venezuela’s democracy had been consolidated around a series of political pacts that relied on 
consensus building among the main political parties, labour unions and business associations. 
Two-thirds of cabinet ministers were from outside the governing political party, a move that 
created resentment and opposition in the legislative assemblies, including within AD.62 
Moreover, Pérez and his ministers’ discourse were confrontational and insulting to anti-Pérez 
factions within AD. Miguel Rodriguez, the planning minister labelled reform critics as 
“dinosaurs”, “unadapted”, “cowards”, and “unschooled”, and Pérez did little to dissociate 
himself from such remarks.63 Such a discourse contributed to the ‘activation of boundaries’ 
between the self-proclaimed ‘modern’ reformers and the ‘backward’ old guard of the political 
parties.  The creation and activation of boundaries contribute to the escalation of political 
conflict and violence.64 The break with pact-making and consultation exacerbated the 
emerging factionalism between and within political parties, and was largely responsible for 
the adversarial executive-party relations in the first three years of reform, and the massive 
increase in corruption scandals and accusations in the period.65 As a result, political 
instability and investment risks increased. 
 
One way to gauge the increase in conflict is to examine inflation levels, which reflect 
increases in the intensity of distributive struggles,66 and the increasing inability of the state to 
manage such conflicts. While Venezuela’s inflation rates have been relatively low by Latin 
American standards throughout, as indicated in Table 7, the rises in the 1980s and 1990s have 
been significant in terms of the country’s own record of low inflation: 
                                                                                                                                                        
system and a deterioration of state institutions and public services (M. López Maya, ‘Hugo Chávez Frías: His 
Movement and His Presidency’, in S. Ellner and D. Hellinger (eds), Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: 
Class, Polarization and Conflict, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003, p.83).   
60 J. Corrales, Presidents without Parties, University Park: Penn State Press, 2002, p.51. 
61 Interviews with military officers and leaders of the Bolivarian Circles (June 2003). 
62 Stambouli (2002) pp.179-180. 
63 Corrales (2002), p.122. 
64 C. Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.96. 
65 The rebellion of Pérez’s own party, along with the 1989 riots, contributed to the isolation of the Executive.  
Such isolation ‘signalled’ a legitimacy crisis for the government, which, in turn, emboldened further attacks 
against the state (Corrales, 2002, p.167).  The most notable examples were the two coup attempts in 1992 and the 
support among all political parties for the impeachment of Pérez, (who was forced to resign in May 1993). 
66 B. Rowthorn, Capitalism, Conflict and Inflation, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971. 
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Table 7: Inflation Rates in Latin America, 1960-2002 
(average, annual change, %) 
  1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-98 1998-2002 
Average 14.4 72.0 223.0 253.0 9.6 
Venezuela 1.0 6.6 23.0 50.1 23.4 
Argentina 22.4 132.9 565.7 281.1 7.1 
Peru 9.9 26.5 481.3 897.3 3.3 
Chile 26.6 174.6 21.4 12.7 3.5 
Colombia 12.0 19.3 23.5 23.7 10.6 
Source: World Bank, various years  
 
Clearly, economic liberalisation did not generate a constellation of political constituents 
capable of imposing stable macroeconomic management within the state.67   
 
 
The increase in executive-party tensions, along with two coup attempts, heightened the 
resistance to reforms.  Indeed, the Pérez government was forced to abandon many reforms.  
The programmes abandoned included banking reform, the creation of a Macroeconomic 
Stabilisation Fund, and increases in petroleum product prices.68 Abandoning some reforms 
contributed to further political destabilisation.  For example, the failure of the state to 
implement a meaningful and progressive tax reform signalled that the wealthier groups were 
able to effectively resist shouldering the burdens of reforms. When tax reform was finally 
implemented in 1995, the main increases were in value-added taxes, which increased from 0.5 
percent of GDP in 1990-1994 to 3.9 percent of GDP in 1995-1998.69 Income and property 
taxes remained negligible,70 and were among the lowest on the continent.  The regressiveness 
of value-added taxes and the generally low tax effort on the rich further exacerbated the 
growing problem of income inequality and the polarisation of politics. Regardless of the 
desirability of these reforms, the capability approach does not explain where the power and 
legitimacy of the state to implement reforms will come from to maintain the reform process. 
 
The perception that corruption increased in the context of liberalisation also refutes the 
predictions of the ‘capability approach’. The reasons for this increase are complex though 
several factors have contributed. First, the insulated manner in which policy reforms were 
introduced ran contrary to the consultative processes that had characterized the political pacts 
upon which Venezuelan democracy was built since 1958.  Such insulation exacerbated 
factionalism within the governing party and between the government and opposition parties. 
                                                 
67 A further indication failed macroeconomic policy can be seen in increasing exchange rate crises, particularly 
after 1983. From 1942-1961, the exchange rate remained fixed at 3.30 bolivares/dollar. Following a balance of 
payments crisis in the late 1950’s, the exchange rate was devalued to 4.20 in 1961 and remained fixed between 
4.20 and 4.40 from 1961-1982. In the period 1983-1999, the country experienced four different currency regimes 
and six currency crises. By 1988, the free market rate had fallen to 28.2/dollar during the multiple exchange rate 
regime in the period 1985-1988. Unification of the exchange rate as part of the economic liberalisation package 
brought a further devaluation to 50.5/dollar by the end of 1990.  The long-run trend decline has continued as the 
exchange rate fell to below 600/dollar by the end of 1999. 
68 Corrales (2002), p.61. 
69 V. Tanzi, ‘Taxation in Latin America in the Last Decade’, paper prepared for conference on ‘Fsical and 
Financial Reforms in Latin America’, Stanford Univeristy, November 9-10, 2000, p.22. 
70 C. Obregón & F. Rodríguez, ‘La Politica Fiscal Venezolana 1943-2001’, Reporte de Coyuntura Annual 2001, 
Caracas: Oficina de Asesoría Económica y Financiera, 2001, p.25. 
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This increase in factionalism increased the degree of ‘whistle-blowing’, as those left out of 
decision-making used the corruption scandal as a weapon of political contestation. Moreover, 
the high levels of campaign financing by some of the prominent business groups for the Perez 
presidency created animosities among rival contenders within AD, and fuelled allegations that 
Pérez supporters would benefit from reforms. Rafael Caldera emerged as the leading political 
opponent of neo- liberal reforms in the early 1990s on an anti-corruption platform. He won the 
presidency in 1994. Second, the media increased and magnified the coverage of scandals, 
including the growing anti-corruption discourse among politicians and rival economic groups, 
which increased public perception that corruption was increasing. 71 The fact that few scandals 
ever resulted in arrests or penalties further fuelled public outrage. Third, the failure of the 
state to effectively regulate the banking system allowed bank owners and managers to engage 
in the illegal diversion of funds to off-shore accounts and to illegally fund their related 
business interests in non-banking ventures.72 Finally, the decline real wages in combination 
with growing inequality quite likely reduced the tolerance the majority of people had for 
corruption and thus corruption scandals became politically more explosive and de-stabilising. 
 
Finally, the liberalisation period coincided with a decided disintegration in the legitimacy of 
the political party system and growing crisis of governability, which was manifested in the 
ensuing social unrest and political violence. The magnitude of the crisis in governability was 
evident with the decline in the legitimacy of the dominant governing political parties, as 
evidenced in dramatic increases in voter abstentionism.73 Apart from growing abstentionism, 
there are several other clear indicators of the decline in the legitimacy of the two dominant 
political parties since the consolidation of democracy in 1958. While one of the two parties 
has won the presidency from 1958 onwards; since 1993, neither party has held the presidency. 
There were also two abortive military coups in 1992, and the impeachment of Carlos Andrés 
Pérez’s presidential term in 1994 on corruption charges.  
 
In 1998, the landslide presidential victory of a popular political outsider and former coup-
plotter, Hugo Chávez and his Fifth Republic Movement, based on a radical (‘Bolivarian’) 
nationalist doctrine, and the virtual disappearance of the once dominant political parties, AD 
and COPEI, manifests a rupture in a dramatic period of evolving crisis. The nature of 
Venezuelan democracy has, like many of its Andean neighbours experiencing economic 
crises, moved toward a stronger presidential system with a declining role for political parties, 
along with the rise of political outsiders/anti-políticos.  The Chávez administration, taking 
advantage of high levels of electoral support, changed the Constitution in 1999.  These 
changes have curtailed the funding of political parties significantly. Moreover, Chávez 
increased the political role of the military and greatly increased patronage appointing military 
officers loyal to him to high public offices in the state.  This, along with a strong anti-
oligarchic discourse, polarised politics significantly in the period 2000-2003. 
 
                                                 
71 Pérez Perdomo, ‘Corruption and Political Crisis’, in L. Goodman, J. Forman, M. Naím, J. Tulchin & G. Bland 
(eds.), Lessons from the Venezuelan Experience, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 
72 De Krivoy (2002). 
73 Since the consolidation of democratic elections in 1958, voter abstention rates averaged 7.6% in the five 
presidential elections in the period 1958-1983. From 1983, these rates increased dramatically: 18.1% in 1988, 
39.8% in 1993 and 32.3% in 1998. At the regional and local levels, the average level of abstention in state and 
local elections since the institution of decentralized elections in 1979 has been dramatically increasing as well.  
The aggregate figures for state/local abstention rates are as follows: 1979 (27.1%), 1984 (40.7%), 1989 (55.0%), 
1992 (52.8%), 1995 (53.9%). The data on all abstention rates from 1958-1995 are taken from Grindle (2000), 
p.83. The figures for 1998 are taken from the Venezuelan National Commission of Elections (www. 
Elecciones.eud.com/absten.ntm). 
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The Venezuelan Experience in Comparative Perspective 
In comparative perspective, the breakdown and crisis of the Venezuelan state to govern the 
economy was among the most severe in Latin America in the 1990s. While it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to explore detailed comparisons, there are several factors that may have 
contributed to the more de-stabilising effects of neoliberalism in Venezuela.  
 
First, politically, neoliberalism became associated in Venezuela with a worsening of income 
distribution. In the period 1970-1990, Venezuela had among the least unequal distributions of 
income in Latin America: only Uruguay, Costa Rica, Peru and Cuba were less unequal.74 
However, in the period 1990-1997, the growth in income inequality in Venezuela was the 
fastest in the region. 75 In comparative terms, the growth in inequality was perhaps more 
destabilizing politically in Venezuela than in other reformers, where the initiation of reforms 
began with among the highest levels of income inequality such as in Brazil, Chile or Mexico. 
In the latter countries, there was little scope for income distribution to worsen further. This 
suggests that rapid increases in income inequality matter more for instability than initial 
levels of inequality (Brazil and Chile have had much higher levels of income inequality yet 
have proven much more stable politically). 
 
Secondly, hiding reform intentions and then attempting policy switches can be particularly 
de-stabilising in a long-standing democracy where economic programmes were generally 
predictable and known. Given the comparatively inclusive and consultative tradition in 
Venezuelan politics, such a “policy switch”76 may have proved more de-stabilising than in 
many other Latin American reformers where either democratic politics was less salient (i.e. 
Chile, Mexico, Argentina) or where more chaotic macroeconomic management resulting in 
hyper- inflation and policy switches were a common feature of recent pre-reform history (i.e. 
Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil). 
 
Third, the absence of immediate threats to the economy and polity also made a radical policy 
switch less justifiable, and thus less legitimate to many interest groups.  Venezuela was 
experiencing a crisis of long-run economic stagnation but its effects were gradual. First, the 
economy was not experiencing hyper- inflation, which damages the incomes of the poor and 
middle-classes and which requires immediate and draconian measures as were implemented 
in Argentina and Peru.  Second, there was no threat of guerrilla insurgency as in Peru or 
Colombia.  Such threats can give the executive greater legitimacy and leverage to act without 
legislative consent. Finally, many people still believed Venezuela was a rich oil economy and 
did not need reforms.77 
 
Finally, the failure of the Pérez government to forge an effective alliance with all tiers of the 
military, especially in the context of its party-neglecting strategy, proved disastrous. Many of 
the middle-ranking military officers had been disgruntled with the control political parties had 
                                                 
74 Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), Development Beyond Economics, Washington D.C.: IABD, 
2000; Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Market, Socialist, and Mixed Economies: Comparative Policy and Performance, 
Chile, Cuba and Costa Rica, Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000, Table V.14, 
p.639. 
75 M. Szekely M. Hilgert, ‘The 1990’s in Latin America: Another Decade of Persistent Inequality’, Working 
Paper, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department, 1999. 
76 S. Stokes, ‘What do policy switches tell us about democracy?’ in A. Przeworski, S. Stokes and B. Manin 
(eds), Democracy, Accountability and Representation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
77 M. Naím, ‘The Real Story Behind Venezuela’s Woes’, Journal of Democracy, 12:2 (2001), p.20. 
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over promotions – a problem Pérez ignored.78 In comparative perspective, Fujimori in Peru, 
while also antagonistic to parties, was more successful in maintaining stability and the reform 
process precisely because his government made an effective alliance with the military, and 
even increased its role in the government.   Given the shifts in power balances and assets that 
liberalisation can bring, it is perhaps no accident that the relatively successful reconstruction 
of public authority and state capacity in Chile and Mexico, two countries undertaking 
neoliberal reforms, was achieved in the context of non-democratic continuity. 79  
 
 
Lessons from Neo-liberal Reforms in Venezuela 
The logic of the state abdication model is to reduce the discretionary control by the state over 
rent creation through economic liberalisation and advocate greater democracy, which is 
supposed to make state action more accountable, transparent and predictable. Firstly, there is 
no evidence that state abdication, by reducing some type of state-created rents, reduces rent-
seeking and corruption. The regulatory structure of the state is still open to influencing under 
any type of economic regime. Secondly, democratic reforms, and in particular, 
decentralisation,  have not made the regulatory environment more secure. If anything, the 
institutional environment has become more uncertain with the decline in the legitimacy of 
political parties and government ministries in this period. 
 
The Venezuelan experience also calls into question many other implicit assumptions with 
respect to the capability approach. First, ‘building up’ state capacities are marginalised in 
favour of ‘levelling down’ the state’s role in the economy. Second, it is suggested that the net 
benefits of living with market failures outweigh the net benefits of actual state interventions in 
most developing countries. Neither of the first two assumptions is valid for the Venezuelan 
experience. Downsizing the state has, far from improving state capacity led to a collapse in 
the Venezuelan state regulatory capacity. There is little sensitivity in the capability approach 
to the historical factors behind the size of the state, and how a state’s size may serve important 
functions of, for example, maintaining political stability and social cohesion. Third, there is 
little distinction made between low and middle- income countries.  This is an important lacuna 
since, for poor economies, resource constraints may limit effective state capacity, whereas the 
relevant question for middle- income countries is why capacity is missing. Fourth, the 
capability approach endorses the idea that there are prerequisite capacity requirements to 
economic development. This is ahistorical. As Gerschenkron argued, the very process of 
embarking on late industrialization occurred despite the lack of any obvious prerequisite 
capacities in late developers.80 As such, late development involves the development of 
capacity and endowment in the very course of industrialisation. In any case, there is little 
evidence that long-run growth paths were initiated in any late developing country by 
liberalising trade and reducing corruption. Finally, the capacity of the state to effectively 
regulate market activity (i.e. competition policy, financial regulation) is judged to be 
unproblematic in a more liberalised market economy. One of the reasons for this may be that 
there is little discussion of the large-scale rents that neo- liberal reforms create. The reality is 
                                                 
78 F. Aguero, ‘Debilitating Democracy: Political Elites and Military Rebels’, in L. Goodman, J. Forman, M. 
Naím, J. Tulchin and G. Bland. (eds), Lessons from the Venezuelan Experience, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1995. 
79 M. Cavarozzi, ‘Politics: A Key for the Long-Term in South America’, in W.C. Smith, C.H. Acuña and E.A. 
Gamarra (eds), Latin American Political Economy in the Age of Neoliberal Reform, Miami: North-South Center, 
1994, p.138. 
80 A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
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that financial deregulation, large-scale privatisations, and private monopolies create large 
rents, and thus rent-seeking/corruption opportunities. Moreover, the fact that much of these 
rents are new implies that the state will need to immediately develop regulatory capacities; 
otherwise monopoly power can be exercised relatively easily. The inability of the Venezuelan 
state to effectively implement financial reforms and regulations is a case in point.  ‘Getting 
institutions right’ is not simply a technical exercise but requires an understanding of politics, 
and in particular, where and how the power and legitimacy of the state to enforce rules and 
defend property rights will arise. 
 
While decline in state capacity and economic decline have been a main factor behind the 
collapse of the old pacted democracy, it is important to incorporate the role specific strategies 
played in the systems demise.  This downfall was not an inevitable result of economic decline 
as some have argued.81 The inevitability of decline also prevails more generally in new 
institutional theories of path dependency that view degenerate development paths and 
stagnation as historically inevitable given the set of institutions a country inherits.82  Path 
dependency allows no room for politics or agency and would thus seem ill suited as a 
framework for understanding the contemporary trajectory of the Venezuelan polity. The 
timing of the breakdown requires explanation, and the contingent political strategies to 
implement reform and their political and economic impacts need, at least, to be included in 
the multifaceted process that constitutes the collapse of the party system and the capacity of 
the state to govern the economy. Finally, the brief comparison with other Latin American 
economies suggests that policy switches and political party-neglecting strategies are 
potentially more de-stabilising in long-standing democracies where consultation is an 
inherited feature of the polity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
81 Penfold-Becerra (2001); R. Hausmann, ‘Venezuela’s Growth Implosion: A Neoclassical Story?’ in D. Rodrik 
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